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A??? ??? ???? ???? 281 557 000 33.59% 41.75%
B??? ??? ???? ???? 55 674 000 66.41% 8.25%























??? 2001? 3? 12??2002? 2? 1??2002? 4? 1









? 62.0%?B?????? 61.7%?????? 2004??
IPO??????? 14 142 135?A?????????



































????? ???? ?? ? ?
?????????????B?????Larry Page?
Sergey Brin???????????
? 2?????????CEO Eric Schmidt????





































? 2011? 5??????? 2012? 4??????
?????????????????????????
?????????????????????????
???? Fenwick & West LLP?Latham & Watkins LLP?
????Perella Weinberg Partners LP?????????












?????????? ??????????? ?????????? ? ?????????? ??????????? ?????????? ? ?????????? ??????????? ?????????? ?
2005 1 631 1 724 1 631 0 0 0 33 411 41 999 24 741
2006 1 724 1 724 1 724 0 0 0 0 0 555 742
2007 1 724 1 724 1 899 0 0 0 0 0 478 662
2008 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 508 763
2009 1 730 1 661 1 661 0 0 0 0 0 243 661
2010 1 786 1 786 1 786 0 0 0 0 0 311 433
2011 1 1 937 500 0 0 93 779 080 0 0 6 263 682
2012 1 1 7 250 000 0 0 0 0 0 378 624
2013 1 1 7 250 000 0 0 11 364 184 0 0 708 196
2014 1 1 7 250 000 0 0 0 0 0 3 059 791
2015 1 1 7 252 808 0 0 0 0 0 783 370
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A New Role of Independent Directors: Litigation Risk Buff ering
—— A Case Study of Google
YUAN Xin?LIU Feng
Abstract: This paper analyzes Google’s 2012 recapitalization case and discusses the role that 
Google’s independent directors have served herein. Our analysis and discussion shows that during 
the recapitalization, the independent directors successfully mitigate the interest conflicts between 
Google’s founders and its outside shareholders, and buffer the litigation risk arising from outside 
backlash. We also reveal that, contrary to the prediction of current corporate governance theory, 
in this case, Google’s independent directors do not effectively monitor the founders, who are the 
actual decision makers of Google. Thus, on the ground of Google’s 2012 recapitalization case, we 
tend to argue that independent directors are able to protect and even increase firm value through 
buffering the litigation risk faced by decision makers, especially in high-tech companies similar to 
Google.
Key words: independent directors; litigation risk; risk buffering; multi-class ownership
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